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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 20020885-SC 
Defendant/Appellant Rehan Hassan has raised two issues on appeal. The first 
concerns the trial court's failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of Hassan's 
right to a jury at trial. The second concerns Hassan's right to the effective assistance of 
counsel during an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. (See Brief of Appel-
lant, dated October 9, 2003.) Hassan has addressed both issues under the plain-error 
doctrine. (Id.) This Court has ruled that it will consider an issue on appeal that was not 
preserved below where the issue is raised under the plain-error or manifest-injustice 
doctrine. In order to obtain relief under those doctrines, appellant must show that an 
error exists that should have been obvious to the trial court, and the error was harmful in 
that it affected the substantial rights of the accused. See State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 
853 (Utah 1992); State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, fflj40-41, 82 P.3d 1106; State v. Dunn. 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Hassan has made the requisite showing for plain error 
and/or manifest injustice in this case for each issue on appeal. (See. Brief of Appellant.) 
In response, the state does not dispute Hassan's application of the plain-error 
doctrine. Rather, with respect to the first issue, the state asserts that Hassan has not 
challenged the lower court's determination that the jury waiver was "clear and informed." 
(See State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief), 3 n.2, 15, 17, 19-20.) By that assertion, 
the state seems to claim that a conclusion reached by Judge Burton regarding the jury 
waiver is binding. (Id., 3 n.2.) The state is mistaken for the following reasons. 
First, Judge Burton did not consider the total circumstances in deciding the matter. 
(See R. 456 (the April 2000 transcript of the waiver colloquy with Judge Stirba was filed 
on November 18, 2002) Case No. 991911407 ("Case 11407") at 419-426 (Judge Burton's 
findings and conclusions on the new trial motion were signed earlier, on November 12, 
2002).) Hence, Hassan has raised the issue as plain error. 
Hassan's analysis considers Judge Stirba's colloquy, which Judge Burton did not 
consider when he ruled. If this Court determines that the waiver colloquy was insuffi-
cient under the totality of the circumstances, it may reverse/vacate the proceedings and 
convictions that flowed from the improper colloquy, including the trial court's determina-
tion of guilt (Case 11407:182-87), and its later determination that the waiver was "clear 
and informed" (Case 11407:423). See State v. Shumwav. 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94 
(vacating murder conviction, where trial court's instructions were improper under an 
analysis not considered below); State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 1065 (vaca-
ting guilty plea where colloquy was improper under an analysis not considered below), 
affd on other grounds. 2001 UT 68, [^13, 31 P.3d 528; Sate v. Labrum .925 P.2d 937 
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(Utah 1996) (vacating enhanced sentence where trial court's application of the 
enhancement was improper under an analysis not considered below). 
Second, even if Judge Burton's ruling may be relevant to the issue here, that ruling 
is a question of law, reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court. The 
trial court's determination is not binding here. State v. Daniels. 2002 UT2, ^17-18, 40 
P.3d 611 (questions of law are reviewed for correctness where the appellate court decides 
the matter itself). 
Third, contrary to the state's assertions (see State's Brief, 3 n.2, 15, 17, 19-20), 
Hassan has challenged the validity of the jury waiver on appeal. He maintains that the 
total circumstances, including events that transpired in open court prior to trial, support 
that he "did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to be tried by an impartial 
jury." (Brief of Appellant, 7-24.) The state's contrary claims should be disregarded. 
In short, Judge Burton's determination that the jury waiver was clear and informed 
was based on limited information. The court made the determination in connection with 
Hassan's new trial motion, but without considering the waiver in the context of Judge 
Stirba's colloquy. (See R. 456 (the April 2000 transcript of the colloquy, dated Nov. 18, 
2002); Case 11407:419-426 (Judge Burton's conclusion regarding waiver, signed Nov. 
12, 2002).) Also, the colloquy was inadequate. The validity of the waiver here is subject 
to review for plain error and manifest injustice, as set forth in Hassan's opening brief. 
Next, Hassan was denied his right to counsel in the evidentiary hearing on the new 
trial motion. The record fails to support that Hassan's decision to represent himself was 
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voluntary. The state disagrees and focuses on Hassan's history with counsel. That history 
reflects Hassan's frustrations with the proceedings below rather than a voluntary waiver. 
The record also fails to support that Hassan's waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
The state disagrees and maintains that during separate colloquies, Judges Lubeck and 
Burton considered Hassan's education and intelligence and warned Hassan that he would 
be at a disadvantage. Under State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), that is insuf-
ficient. Hassan was entitled to the assistance of counsel in the evidentiary hearing on the 
new trial motion. This case should be remanded for proper proceedings in that regard. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS APPLY THE 
TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE 
THE VALIDITY OF A WAIVER. HERE, THAT ANALYSIS FAILS 
TO SUPPORT THAT HASSAN KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY. 
AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY. 
A. TO BEGIN. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT HASSAN MADE CERTAIN 
CONCESSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE JURY WAIVER ISSUE 
BELOW. THE STATE IS MISTAKEN. 
The state claims that during a hearing on the new trial motion, Hassan "conceded" 
that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to be tried by a jury. (State's Brief, 
e.g., 3 n.2, 17.) In support of that claim, the state has cited to the record at 454:29, 50, 
56-57, & 144. (Id.) Those portions of the record reflect the following. 
During a hearing on the new trial motion, Hassan appeared pro se and examined 
his former attorney, Ed Montgomery. Montgomery acknowledged that he did not 
proceed with the trial in a way that Hassan expected. (R. 454:28-29; see_ also 454:41, 
114.) Montgomery did not call an expert and he did not present character testimony from 
Hassan's roommate as Hassan anticipated. (See R. 454:44-45, 54-55, 57-58, 61-62.) The 
testimony was relevant to Hassan. (See e.g., 454:29, 114.) Hassan believed it would 
raise "reasonable doubt in the mind of Judge Stirba that this thing did not happen 
[referring to the charged offenses]." (R. 454:29.) 
The state cites to this excerpt as support for a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
the right to a jury. (State's Brief, 3 n.2; 17.) Yet, the excerpt demonstrates that Hassan 
believed he and his attorney had settled on a particular trial strategy. Hassan believed 
that Judge Stirba would find reasonable doubt based on that strategy. (R. 454:29.) The 
record supports that Montgomery's unilateral change in strategy at the "11th hour" 
undermined Hassan's earlier decisions. (See R. 454:28-29, 114, 144.) It does not 
support the state's assertion. 
Next, the state cites to the hearing at 454:50, 56-57. According to those excerpts, 
Montgomery stated that the bench trial was "Rehan's decision" and Montgomery 
"discuss[ed] that with him." (R. 454:50.) Those excerpts do not constitute a concession 
by Hassan that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to an impartial jury. See 
Pattonv. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 298, 312-13 (1930) (recognizing that the constitutional 
right to a jury is for the protection of the accused, and waiver must be knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent); also (Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.B., I.C., I.D.). 
Indeed, there is nothing in the excerpts to indicate that prior to waiver, Hassan 
was informed about the jury process: that he may participate injury selection and the 
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judge would supervise the jury in the law and facts. Patton, 281 U.S. at 288, 312-13 (an 
essential element of the right to a jury is that the jury will be under the superintendence 
of a judge, who will instruct the jury in the law and facts; to obtain an effective waiver of 
that right, a trial court must be cautious of the "essential elements" and avoid unrea-
sonable departure from them). Also, he was not informed of the right to an impartial 
jury. (See R. 454; 456.) 
With respect to the record at 454:56-57, at the hearing the trial court also asked 
Montgomery questions about the jury waiver. Montgomery stated, 
[Hassan] brought it up, and I think the theory was Rehan had always been 
concerned he might not get a fair shake from a white jury. I didn't necessarily 
disagree with him. To a certain extent I agreed about that. I believe part of it — 
and I think Rehan is in the best position to talk about that. 
(R. 454:56-57.) Also, "[Hassan] felt [Judge Stirba] would be more neutral and could 
give him a fair trial and a fair judgment. I think he had a good feel for about [sic] it." 
(R. 454:57.) As stated in the opening brief, that excerpt supports that Hassan was con-
cerned that a jury would be prejudiced against him. (Brief of Appellant, 14-19.) Not-
withstanding his concerns, neither Montgomery nor the judge advised him of the right to 
an impartial jury. (Id,) The circumstances here are plain: Hassan was allowed to believe 
that he could obtain a fair trial only if he waived the jury. He was not advised of his right 
to an impartial jury, and yet he was the person who needed that information in 
considering waiver, since his concerns related to juror bias. 
Finally, in support of its claims, the state cites to Hassan's argument to Judge 
Burton on the new trial motion. (State's Brief, 3 n.2; 17 (citing R. 454:144).) There, 
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Hassan expressed that he was denied a fair trial because his attorney failed to present 
witnesses and evidence as planned. Montgomery failed to disclose his change in trial 
strategy to Hassan until just prior to trial. (R. 454:144.) Hassan stated that the strategy 
that he and Montgomery had planned was important to Hassan in his analysis of the case, 
his life, and his decision not to take the plea bargain. He believed that "everything would 
be brought up in front of the judge." (R. 454:144.) 
He also stated that it was his decision "to pick the judge, because I felt she would 
treat me — she would be more fair to me." (R. 454:144.) Again, those statements do not 
constitute a concession or admission from Hassan that the waiver was knowing and 
voluntary. Rather, the record supports that Hassan made important decisions in his case 
because he believed that Montgomery would proceed with a given strategy. 
Montgomery betrayed Hassan's trust, undermining the validity of Hassan's decisions. 
The record excerpts identified by the state and the total circumstances fail to sup-
port that Hassan knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury. 
B. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL WAIVER 
MUST BE KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY. 
The state does not dispute that state and federal provisions guarantee the right to 
be tried by an impartial jury. See (Brief of Appellant, Point LA.); Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1 )(f) (2003); Singer v. U.S. . 380 U.S. 
24, 36 (1965) (MA defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is 
to an impartial trial by jury"); State v. Wach. 2001 UT 35, Tf36, 24 P.3d 948 ("Both the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a 
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fair and impartial jury"); State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f33, 992 P.2d 951 (stating an 
impartial jury is essential to a fair trial). In fact, the constitution specifically uses the 
word "impartial" in identifying this fundamental guarantee. U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
Likewise, trial courts are charged with protecting a defendant's constitutional 
rights at trial. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312-13 (articulating a trial court's duty in protecting 
the right to a jury at trial); Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (e)(14) (2003) (the judge shall preside 
over the jury selection process, and shall prohibit any person from serving on the jury 
unless the judge is "convinced" the juror will act impartially) and Advisory Committee 
Notes (the judge may seat only those jurors who will "act fairly and impartially"; also, the 
judge shall "remove from the venire panel persons who cannot act impartially in 
deliberating upon a verdict"); State v. Hubbard. 2002 UT 45, ^ [33 & n.7, 48 P.3d 953 (the 
selection of jurors "arguably has a reasonably substantial relation to the fulness of a 
defendant's opportunity to defend against a charge"); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 
241, [^14 n.6, 31 P.3d 615 (recognizing that under federal rules, the defendant shall be 
present when the trial court impanels the jury), affjd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. 
In this case, the state does not dispute that the total circumstances surrounding 
Hassan's waiver support that he had concerns that the jury would be racist and biased 
against him. The state asserts that Hassan "was concerned that a Utah jury would be less 
inclined to believe a Muslim Pakistani national, like himself, and more likely to credit 
white Americans, like the [alleged victims]." (State's Brief, 14.) Hassan expressed con-
cern throughout the process that he would not get a fair trial from a jury, and he 
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proceeded to trial with the judge because of his concerns regarding juror bias and 
prejudice. (See State's Brief at 14-15; Brief of Appellant, 14-22.) 
The state also has recognized that here, when the trial court obtained the waiver, 
the court explained "that a Utah jury would consist of eight members, whose verdict was 
required to be unanimous. See Add. B. The trial court did not further explain the jury 
selection process to defendant". (State's Brief, 19.) Yet, the trial court was required to 
be mindful of the elements essential to the constitutional right to a jury. 
Those elements were — (1) that the jury should consist of twelve [or in this case, 
eight] men [or women], neither more nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the 
presence and under the superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them 
as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts; and (3) that the verdict 
should be unanimous. 
Patton. 281 U.S. at 288. 
The trial court here made no effort to explain that Hassan would be allowed to 
participate in the selection process and that the court would supervise and advise the jury 
on the law and the facts. Yet, that is an element essential to the right to a jury. IcL_ The 
court failed to discuss the "impartial" jury and the process relating thereto. 
Indeed, the state does not dispute that the trial court allowed Hassan to believe 
that the only way he would receive a fair trial would be to waive the jury. (See State's 
Brief, Argument, Point I.) That was improper. 
Hassan was not familiar with the American legal system. (R. 449:16 (no prior 
experiences)); he was not even aware of the right to an impartial jury. (See Brief of 
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Appellant, 14-19.) He was not familiar with the jury process: that he would be able to 
strike prospective jurors from the panel if he considered them to be prejudiced against 
him or racist; and he was not aware of the role the court played in instructing and ad-
vising the jury in the case. And while the judge knew that Hassan feared a racist, all-
white, anti-Muslim jury, the judge advised him only that a jury would consist of eight 
people, who had to reach a unanimous decision, and the jury would not hear the 
evidence, she would. (See Brief of Appellant, 14-19; R. 456:5-8.) The trial court's 
colloquy did not nothing to mitigate Hassan's fears and concerns. 
In this case, under the total circumstances and the constitution, the trial judge was 
required to jealously preserve and maintain Hassan's right to the jury as the fact finding 
body. The court had the duty to be conscious of the circumstances compelling Hassan to 
forego the jury: His belief that a jury would be "inherently] racisft]" against him. 
(State's Brief, 14.) The court was required to ensure that under the unique circumstances 
of this case, Hassan's waiver was a knowing, intelligent, voluntary choice among 
alternative options open to him under the constitution. 
The state suggests in a footnote that Hassan's reasons for waiving the jury here 
were legitimate. "A defendant's fear of undetected jury bias or prejudice is a common 
and accepted reason to waiver [sic] a jury." (State's Brief, 17 n. 17.) In the abstract, 
Hassan does not dispute that assertion. However, while Hassan expressed fear that a jury 
would be biased or racist, he had no reason to know that he had the right to an impartial 
jury or that he would be allowed to participate injury selection where he could have 
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asked questions and exercised peremptory or cause challenges based on juror bias. He 
did not know that the jury would be supervised at every stage of the trial since those 
matters were never mentioned. Under the circumstances, that information was particular-
ly relevant to Hassan since his waiver was driven by a fear that he would not be treated 
fairly by a jury. The trial court allowed Hassan's ignorance about the system to govern 
his decision to waive a constitutional guarantee. The waiver was fundamentally flawed. 
C. THE PLAIN-ERROR ANALYSIS COMPELS REVERSAL HERE. 
1. The Total Circumstances Fail to Support a Proper Waiver. 
The state asserts that in order to find plain error, the trial-court error must be pre-
dicated on controlling authority. (State's Brief, 18.) In this case, controlling authority 
entitles a defendant to be tried by an impartial jury. (Brief of Appellant, Point LA.); Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f). Controlling 
authority also provides that a defendant may waive that right. The defendant's waiver 
must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Brief of Appellant, Point LB.) 
According to the state, Utah law does not mandate a particular colloquy in ob-
taining a jury waiver. (State's Brief, 16.) The state asserts that the validity of a jury 
waiver is judged by the total, surrounding circumstances. (Id.) A totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis looks to the particular factual context of a case. Thus, according 
to the state's analysis and pursuant to the law, to determine the validity of the waiver, this 
Court must assess the unique facts and circumstances surrounding this case. 
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The state also asserts that federal courts apply the totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis to jury waivers. (State's Brief, 19.) The state suggests without asserting that a 
federal analysis does not apply here. (See State's Brief, 18.) Yet, Hassan has raised the 
waiver issue on appeal in the context of the federal constitution. (Brief of Appellant, 
Point LA.)1 Thus, federal law is relevant. See Patton , 281 U.S. at 312-13 (stating that 
the duty of the trial court in obtaining a waiver of the jury is to avoid undue departures 
from that mode of trial or from "the essential elements thereof, and with a caution 
increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver). 
In considering the totality of the circumstances, federal courts have articulated 
certain considerations that may be relevant to the analysis. Courts consider whether the 
trial court explained the following to the defendant in obtaining a waiver: the jury 
composition, the defendant's participation injury selection, the unanimity requirement, 
and if the defendant waives the jury, the judge alone will decide the case. See U.S. v. 
Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981) (setting guidelines for accepting a jury 
waiver, where the court explains the jury composition, that defendant may participate in 
jury selection, that the jury's verdict must be unanimous, and if defendant waives the jury, 
the judge alone will decide the case); U.S. v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 (10th Cir. 
1
 Hassan's right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the state and federal 
constitutions. (See Brief of Appellant, Point LA.) The Sixth Amendment to the federal 
constitution is made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Argersinger v. 
Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 27 (1972). 
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1995) (j°ining those jurisdictions that assess whether the trial court informed the 
defendant of the jury composition, of his participation injury selection, and of unanimity 
before accepting a jury waiver). That analysis may not be exclusive or exhaustive. 
Indeed, the state and federal courts may not require a particular colloquy for a 
valid waiver. That does not dilute the assessment under the totality of the circumstances. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has urged trial courts to be cautious and to keep an eye toward 
the elements essential to the jury trial in obtaining a waiver. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312-13. 
Also, to ensure preservation of a constitutional form of trial, the Court has specified that 
the record must clearly establish that waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson. 304 U.S. at 464. 
Here, the trial court failed to ensure such a relinquishment. While Hassan had con-
cerns about biased jurors, the court simply advised him that "a Utah jury would consist of 
eight members, whose verdict was required to be unanimous. See Add. B. The trial court 
did not further explain the jury selection process to defendant". (State's Brief, 19.) In this 
case, the right to an impartial jury was not extended to Hassan. He believed that only the 
judge could be fair. His belief resulted from a lack of information about his 
constitutional rights and the function of the jury. In this case, the waiver was defective. 
2. The State Has Made Additional Arguments Regarding the Plain-Error 
Analysis. 
The state asserts that Hassan has not challenged Judge Burton's conclusion that 
the jury waiver was "voluntary and knowing." (See_ State's Brief, 3 n. 2, 15, 17, 19-20.) 
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Yet, Hassan's first argument on appeal is as follows: "Hassan Did Not Knowingly 
and Voluntarily Waive his Right to Be Tried by an Impartial Jury." (Brief of Appellant, 
7.) From there, Hassan has identified the importance of the constitutional right to an 
impartial jury (id., 7-9); he has articulated the standard for assessing whether a defendant 
has knowingly and voluntarily waived such a right (icL 9-14); and he has discussed the 
particular and total circumstances of the purported waiver in this case to show that it was 
not voluntary, intelligent, or knowing (idL_, 14-24). The state's assertions regarding the 
challenge on appeal are incorrect. 
Also, any legal conclusion that Judge Burton made about the matter is subject to 
review under the correctness standard, without deference to the trial court. See Daniels, 
2002 UT 2, Tfl[17-18 (questions of law are reviewed for correctness, where the appellate 
court decides the matter itself). Hassan has provided this Court with sufficient analysis 
to determine that the trial court erred under the law in concluding that the waiver was 
clear, informed, advised, knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Thus, this Court may vacate 
the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.2 
2
 To be clear, Judge Burton found that Hassan talked about the difficulties and benefits 
of waiver with his attorney and wife, and based on that discussion, Hassan decided to 
proceed with a bench trial: "Defendant decided that Judge Stirba would be more favorable 
to defendant rather than a jury that would not likely be able to relate to defendant's 
background and beliefs." (Case 11407:420-21; see also Brief of Appellant, 22 (acknow-
ledging the findings).) That finding and the court's ruling do not consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the waiver, where Hassan was not advised of his right to an 
impartial jury or of his participation in the selection process. 
Hassan incorrectly believed that the only way to obtain a fair trial would be to chose 
Judge Stirba. The lack of information did not allow Hassan to make a knowing and 
voluntary choice about a constitutional right in the matter. 
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In addition, Hassan has raised the issue on appeal under the plain-error and 
manifest-injustice doctrines. The standards there require Hassan to demonstrate that the 
trial court committed a plain or obvious error, affecting his substantial rights. Casey, 
2003 UT 55, fflJ40-41. Hassan has made that showing. (Brief of Appellant, 7-24.) The 
state does not dispute application of the standards and the state does not claim that 
Hassan's showing was procedurally deficient. (See. State's Brief, 14-20.) To the extent 
the state suggests that some additional "challenge" must be made under the plain-error 
analysis (see id., 3 n.2, 15, 17, 19-20), the state has not explained or provided support for 
that notion. (See id, 3 n.2 (citing Davis v. Grand County Service Area. 905 P.2d 888, 
890 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), without discussing it)3.) Hassan's challenge in this case that 
the waiver was not knowing and voluntary is adequate for this Court to review the matter 
3In Davis, parents filed a medical malpractice action against a hospital for the wrongful 
death of their newborn child. After the jury rendered a verdict against them, plaintiffs filed 
a new trial motion "alleging the jury was biased and that, due to the small size of the 
community, it was not possible for them to have received a fair trial in Moab." Id. at 891. 
In support of their motion, the Davises contended one of the jurors slept through much of the 
trial; jurors, who claimed to know defendants, did not say "without a doubt" that they could 
act impartially; the court allowed a defense witness to remain in court during trial, thereby 
enabling the witness to shape her testimony to fit the evidence; and the court allowed a judge, 
who had been recused from the matter, to remain in the court room during trial. Id, at 890. 
The trial court denied the new trial motion, and plaintiffs eventually appealed. On 
appeal, the plaintiffs did not advance any argument raised in the new trial motion. Id. at 891. 
Instead, they argued that "voir dire was inadequate to allow them to meaningfully exercise 
their peremptory challenges, leaving them with a potentially biased jury." IcL at 891. The 
argument was premised on the theory that the jury/community was potentially biased against 
the plaintiffs due to exposure by numerous pretrial newspaper articles in the case. IcL at 890-
91. The court of appeals reviewed the issue on appeal under the plain-error doctrine. IdL at 
892. The court recognized that for plain error, the appellant must demonstrate obvious error 
affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. Id. at 892. The court proceeded with review 
of the matter under that analysis. The Davis case seems to have little application here. 
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on the merits. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.) 
Furthermore, Judge Burton's conclusion obviously did not consider the transcript 
of the waiver proceedings conducted by Judge Stirba in this case. (See R. 454; 455; 456 
(the April 2000 transcript of the colloquy before Judge Stirba was prepared and filed on 
November 18, 2002) Case 11407:419-426 (Judge Burton's findings and conclusions 
were signed a week earlier on November 12, 2002); see, also Brief of Appellant, 7-24.) 
Since Judge Burton did not base his determination about "a clear and informed choice" 
on the total circumstances, his legal conclusion is subject to review under the plain-error 
doctrine as set forth in Hassan's opening brief. (Brief of Appellant, 7-24.) 
In this case, Hassan is not advocating for an innovation in jurisprudence, but 
rather, application of principles long recognized and applied in the criminal justice 
system. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I. (citing Utah Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. 
Const, amend. VI; Patton, 281 U.S. 276 (requiring the waiver of the right to a jury trial to 
be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, with an eye to the essential elements of that 
right); Singer. 380 U.S. at 36; Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^ [36 ("Both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a fair and 
impartial jury"); Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ [33 (stating an impartial jury is essential to a fair 
trial); Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f)).) 
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The improper colloquy in this case affected Hassan's constitutional right to be 
tried by a jury. That constitutes prejudice. The state does not dispute that aspect of the 
analysis. (See State's Brief, 14-20); see also State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 
1986) (stating that "[a] criminal defendant's right to a jury trial is substantial and 
valuable"). Hassan requests that this Court reverse the convictions and remand the case 
for a new trial under the manifest-injustice and plain-error doctrines. 
POINT II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO THE WAIVER 
OF COUNSEL ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VALIDITY 
OF THAT WAIVER. 
In response to Hassan's issue on appeal regarding his right to counsel on the new 
trial motion, the state makes numerous assertions about Hassan's brief and the record.4 
(See State's Brief, 20-33.) Hassan will not address each assertion here, since this Court 
has access to the complete record, and the record and brief speak for themselves. 
Also, in support of its argument, the state in relevant part has cited generally to its 
seven-and-a-half page "statement of the case," which includes 13 footnotes. (See State's 
Brief, 20, 21, 24-26, 29, 32.) The state has not identified any particular portion of the 
"statement of the case" in support of it argument (ijL), and the "statement of the case" 
section does not appear in the argument portion of the state's brief. (See State's Brief.) 
4
 By way of example, the state asserts that Hassan has "isolated questions in the colloquies 
to support his claim of error." (State's Brief, 28 (citing Brief of Appellant, 42-46).) Yet 
Hassan has relied on the complete colloquies and the totality of the circumstances to support 
his argument. (See Brief of Appellant, 27-38, 42-46.) 
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The general references make it difficult for Hassan to respond. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9), (b), (e) (2003) (requiring argument portion to contain citations to the record). 
With respect to the analysis, since the issue on appeal concerns Hassan's right to 
counsel in post-trial proceedings, Hassan's relationship with pre-trial attorneys is 
irrelevant. The analysis here should focus on post-trial events.5 
After the trial, five attorneys appeared and withdrew from representation in the 
case: Mary Corporon,6 Heidi Buchi,7 Stephen McCaughey, Rich Mauro,8 and Manny 
5
 Immediately post-trial, defense attorney Ed Montgomery withdrew from representation. 
That was appropriate. Montgomery admitted during the hearing on the new trial motion that 
Hassan had specific expectations about the trial. Hassan believed that he and Montgomery 
had settled on a strategy, where they would call certain witnesses to testify. (See R. 454:28-
29, 144.) Montgomery understood the strategy was important to Hassan. (See R. 454:114.) 
Hassan made decisions about a plea deal and possibly the decision to waive the jury based 
on the strategy. (R. 454:28-29, 144.) Notwithstanding, Montgomery made a unilateral 
decision not to call the witnesses. He did not disclose his decision to Hassan until the" 11th 
hour" before trial. (R. 454:41-42, 114.) Hassan felt betrayed that Montgomery had not 
discussed the change in strategy with him. In post-trial proceedings, Hassan would be able 
to claim ineffective assistance of counsel since Montgomery withdrew from representation. 
See State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
6According to the record, during post-trial proceedings, Corporon asked for leave to 
withdraw. (R. 448:10-12.) Hassan was confused as to why Corporon made the request and 
he asked to consult with her. (Id.) Thereafter, Hassan did not object to Corporon's request. 
(Id.) The state asserts that Hassan complained about Corporon's representation. (See State's 
Brief, 24 (citing R. 453:7-8).) Yet, there is no indication on this record that Hassan 
complained about or to Corporon while she represented him. 
7
 Hassan did not ask the court to remove Heidi Buchi from the case. (See Brief of 
Appellant, 27-28 n.5; 29 n.7.) 
8
 Mauro withdrew because of a conflict. Mauro specified that the conflict was due to the 
fact that Hassan had filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar against him for failing to 
return transcripts, and the Bar was actively investigating the complaint. (See Case 
11407:393-98.) Mauro tried to reason with Bar counsel on the matter, however, counsel was 
"abrupt" and "demanding]," and in a letter, Bar counsel threatened "disciplinary action" as 
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Garcia. Hassan first asked to represent himself in open court when he appeared with 
McCaughey on August 2, 2001. (See. R. 449:3-4.) Thus, that proceeding and those that 
followed are relevant in assessing whether Hassan validly waived his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.9 
a "sanction." (Case 11407:397.) Those circumstances contributed to Mauro's decision to 
withdraw. While the record does not indicate whether the Bar actually took action against 
Mauro, he considered the threat from the Bar to be serious. (Case 11407:393, 398.) 
9
 The state seems to argue that Hassan knowingly elected self-representation by refusing 
to cooperate with attorneys, by complaining about or rejecting attorneys, by expressing 
distrust with the system and/or because he believed he could make political speeches to the 
court without restriction if he proceeded alone. (See State's Brief, e.g., 21, 22, 24.) 
Yet, the record reflects that during proceedings where Hassan appeared with involved 
counsel, he focused on the issues at hand and he was cooperative and respectful. (See R. 
450, 451, 448, 204.) He did not make political speeches in court. (Id.) 
When Hassan made political or emotional speeches, he later apologized or expressed 
regret. (See R. 454:137; 453:22; 449:20.) In addition, Hassan seemed to realize that his 
emotional speeches made him "look bad." (R. 454:137; 453:22.) 
Although Hassan attempted to make his best case for himself, he did not understand 
how to proceed. (See e.g. R. 449:17; 454:162 (at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing 
on the new trial motion, the court stated that in "most" of Hassan's argument, he asked the 
court to do things it could not do under Rule 24).) He needed the assistance of counsel. He 
also needed consistency, and he wanted to proceed with the new trial motion without delay. 
Yet, according to the record, each attorney who appeared after Montgomery added to 
delays in Hassan's case. That frustrated Hassan. Corporon filed an untimely new trial 
motion, then withdrew before it could be heard (Case 11407:202-05; 448:10-18); 
McCaughey appeared and withdrew because he disagreed with Hassan on strategy even 
before he had a chance to review the trial transcripts (R. 449:3-4); Mauro appeared and began 
an investigation into the motion. When he failed to return Hassan's transcripts to him after 
an unspecified period of time, Hassan filed a Bar complaint. While it is unclear whether 
Hassan or Mauro tried to resolve the matter short of a complaint (see R. 455:5; Case 
11407:399), the Bar considered the matter to be serious enough to threaten sanctions. (Case 
11407:397-98.) When Garcia appeared, Hassan had no complaints about him. Rather, 
Hassan was anxious to proceed without further delays. (R. 455:3-10.) 
Pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, "[CJourts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against [the] waiver" of counsel. Johnson. 304 U.S. at 464. Courts '"do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' A waiver is ordinarily an intentional 
1 9 
During the August 2, 2001 hearing, McCaughey represented to the court that he 
and Hassan had talked about the case, and even though he could argue Hassan's issues, 
he did not feel they were particularly meritorious. McCaughey maintained that Hassan 
wanted to represent himself. (R. 449:3.) The trial court asked Hassan if that was correct. 
(R. 449:4.) Hassan said, "yes, Your Honor," and then discussed political issues and 
issues relating to the trial. (See R. 449:3-12; see also Case 11407:304.) 
Hassan also requested the trial transcripts, and he revealed to the court that he was 
on medication. (R. 449:13.) It is unclear how the medication contributed to Hassan's 
emotional outpouring, or what impact it had on him in general. Notwithstanding, the 
court engaged in a colloquy on self-representation. (R. 449:14-20.) The court obtained 
information about Hassan's background and education (R. 449:15-16), ascertained that 
Hassan had no experiences with the legal system beyond this case (R. 449:16), asked if 
Hassan understood Rule 24, and advised Hassan that the court would be restricted in the 
proceedings by that rule. (Id.) The court advised Hassan that it would be a mistake to 
represent himself (R. 449:17), and the court specified that it would not consider emo-
tional and political arguments not relevant to the motion for a new trial. (R. 449:17.) 
At the conclusion of the colloquy, the court allowed McCaughey to withdraw and 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether 
there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon 
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused." Id (notes omitted). Here, the state is asking this 
Court to presume that Hassan waived his right to the effective assistance of counsel when 
he expressed frustration with delays and with misunderstandings that may have been avoided 
with clearer communications with counsel. That is improper. 
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informed Hassan that it would not appoint another attorney in the case. (R. 449:15-20.) 
The August 2001 colloquy did not support a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel 
for the evidentiary hearing that occurred. (See Brief of Appellant, 28-32, 39-40, 43.) 
Indeed, the trial court did not contemplate such a hearing in connection with the 
colloquy. (Id; R. 449:20.) 
Next, in December 2001, Hassan stated that he wanted to represent himself and he 
stated he would appreciate the assistance of counsel. (R. 457.) Those statements together 
support a request for counsel. U.S. v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(requests to self-represent accompanied by requests for counsel do not constitute waiver 
of the right to counsel); State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,917 (Utah 1998) ("Because of the 
importance of the right to counsel and the heavy burden placed upon the trial court to 
protect this right, there is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver 
must be resolved in the defendant's favor?f) (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464). The court 
appointed attorneys to represent Hassan. (Case 11407:350.) Hassan accepted the 
appointment of counsel. (R. 453:3-4, 17.) 
After several months passed and two more attorneys appeared and withdrew due 
to conflicts,10 on August 16, 2002, Manny Garcia appeared in the case. (R. 455:2.) 
On that date, Judge Burton asked about Hassan's intentions. Hassan wanted to 
proceed with the new trial motion. The judge asked if Hassan wanted Garcia's help. 
10
 Buchi withdrew due to a conflict. (See Brief of Appellant, 27-28 n. 5; 29 n.7.) Mauro 
withdrew due to either a perceived or actual conflict. (See supra, note 8, herein.) 
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Hassan stated Garcia may not be familiar with the case. (R. 455:3-4.) The prosecutor 
suggested that counsel and Hassan be allowed to consult. (R. 455:6.) Garcia stated that 
Hassan wanted to represent himself. (Id.) The judge then asked if Hassan wanted "to go 
on [his] own?" (R. 455:9.) Hassan said, "Yes, your Honor." (Id.) The judge also stated 
that if "today is the day, then you're probably going to have to say, I don't want Mr. 
Garcia's help, I'm going to go on my own." (R. 455:10.) Hassan apologized, then the 
court excused Garcia and engaged in a colloquy on self representation. (R. 455:10-14.) 
During the colloquy the court advised Hassan that he was giving up the right to 
have witnesses testify in connection with the new trial motion. (R. 455:13.) The court 
asked if that was wise, and Hassan answered that he was sick and tired of the situation. 
(Id.) After the colloquy (see R. 455:14), the court handled unrelated matters (R. 455:15), 
then returned to Hassan's case for argument on the new trial motion. (R. 455:17.) 
The state claims that the August 2002 colloquy was sufficient for self-
representation and the waiver of counsel in connection with the evidentiary hearing. 
According to the state, Judge Burton "knew an evidentiary hearing was required and 
discussed this with defendant, including what witnesses he wanted subpoenaed and the 
general parameters with his argument." (State's Brief, 30.) The state cites to several 
record pages. (Id (citing R. 449:20; 453:5-7, 17; 457:2-9; 455:39-45, 65-71).) They are 
not pertinent to the colloquy and the waiver of counsel. 
According to the record, the judge did not contemplate an evidentiary hearing 
when he engaged in a colloquy on self-representation (see. R. 455:10-14), and the judge 
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did not revisit the waiver of counsel when he later realized that the hearing would re-
quire evidence. (See R. 455:39-45, 65-71); Heaton, 958 P.2d 918 ("before the court may 
permit the defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court must conduct 
a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that the defendant's 
waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made"). 
When Judge Burton engaged in the colloquy, he did not ascertain whether Hassan 
understood matters relevant to an evidentiary hearing: that is, the court did not ascertain 
whether Hassan was familiar with procedural and evidentiary rules; whether Hassan 
understood that the rules governed; whether Hassan realized that failure to comply with 
the rules may impact on the credibility of his case and his rights, including the right to 
appeal; whether Hassan understood that he had the right to testify, and if he exercised 
that right, he could not engage in long narrations of the facts and personal views, but 
would have to examine himself and be subjected to cross examination. (R. 455:10-15.) 
Those factors are uniquely relevant to an evidentiary hearing. Yet the judge failed 
to discuss them or to ascertain that Hassan comprehended them in relation to the 
colloquy. See e.g., Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12. 
The record here fails to support that Hassan was actually aware of the risks of pro-
ceeding pro se in an evidentiary hearing. It fails to support that the trial court f'advise[d] 
the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" in the context of 
an evidentiary hearing, "so that the record will establish that '[defendant] knows what he 
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; Frampton, 
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737 P.2d at 188. The court failed to ascertain that Hassan possessed the intelligence and 
capacity to understand the consequence of representing himself in an evidentiary hearing, 
see Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918, and the court failed to ascertain whether Hassan 
comprehended additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter. IcL 
The state seems to trivialize the deficiencies in the colloquy by claiming Hassan 
testified at trial, he appeared to have "little reason1' to testify at the evidentiary hearing, 
and he "fully expressed facts and personal views throughout the new trial proceedings." 
(State's Brief, 31.) Yet, those factors emphasize the need for a proper colloquy. A proper 
colloquy would have ensured that Hassan understood his rights in the hearing, the gover-
ning rules, and that he may not present long narrations and personal views in lieu of 
evidence; he may not make a speech and expect the judge to accept it as evidence. See 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 (recognizing that the record must show that defendant was 
aware of the rules and that presenting his defense is not just a matter of telling his story). 
In this case, where Hassan had facts and personal views to express, he had every 
reason to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Under the circumstances, the court should 
have provided an adequate colloquy on self-representation for the evidentiary hearing so 
that Hassan could make an informed choice about proceeding alone or with counsel, who 
would assist in protecting Hassan's rights and his legal arguments in the hearing. 
In connection with the colloquies, Hassan was not advised of the facts unique to 
an evidentiary hearing. He was not advised of the dangers and disadvantages associated 
with presenting speeches instead of testimony. Hassan was essentially prohibited from 
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presenting evidence of events in the form of his testimony. The colloquies and the 
waiver of counsel were deficient. 
Finally, the state asserts that Hassan has failed to establish prejudice. Hassan 
maintains that since the issue here concerns a substantial constitutional right, he is not 
required to demonstrate prejudice. (See. Brief of Appellant, 47-50.) In addition, Hassan 
has demonstrated prejudice. (Id.) Hassan respectfully requests that this Court remand 
the case for further proceedings on the new trial motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Hassan respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this t ^day of )/\AAVZL 2004. 
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